Maurer School of Law: Indiana University

Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty

Faculty Scholarship

2016

Salman v. United States: Insider Trading's Tipping Point?
Donna M. Nagy
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, dnagy@indiana.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Nagy, Donna M., "Salman v. United States: Insider Trading's Tipping Point?" (2016). Articles by Maurer
Faculty. 2403.
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2403

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by
Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Stanford Law Review Online
Volume 69

October 2016

ESSAY

Salman v. United States:
Insider Trading’s Tipping Point?
Donna M. Nagy*
The Supreme Court’s 2016 term officially begins on the first Monday in
October. But corporate insiders, securities analysts, and professional traders (as
well as securities lawyers and scholars) are focusing their attention on
Wednesday, October 5, when the Court, for the first time in nearly two decades,
will hear argument in an insider trading case. It has been even longer still since
the Court—in its 1983 decision in Dirks v. SEC 1—last grappled with the
circumstances under which tipping and trading on stock tips constitute
violations of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
I am honored to contribute to this important Symposium by setting the
stage for the four Essays that follow. Jill Fisch (Pennsylvania), Donald
Langevoort (Georgetown), Jonathan Macey (Yale), Adam Pritchard (Michigan),
and I (Indiana University-Bloomington) have each been writing about insider
trading law for two or three decades, and our views, expressed in both this
Symposium and prior work, provide contrasting perspectives.
We agree on several matters. First and foremost, each of us expects the
Court in Salman v. United States 2 to affirm the lower court’s decision upholding
the petitioner’s securities fraud and conspiracy convictions for trading on the
basis of stock tips. The tipper in Salman was an investment banker employed at
Citigroup who, on multiple occasions, disclosed to his brother confidential
information about upcoming mergers and acquisitions, knowing that his
brother was using the information to profit in the securities market. 3 The
brother also passed the lucrative information to the petitioner, Bassam Salman,
a family member by marriage, who traded on the tips knowing that the
* C. Ben Dutton Professor of Law and Executive Associate Dean, Indiana University Maurer
School of Law-Bloomington. I am grateful to the Symposium participants and Professors
Hannah Buxbaum, Margaret Sachs, and Hillary Sale for their helpful comments on this
Essay.
1. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
2. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016).
3. Id. at 1088-89.
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information had been misappropriated from Citigroup and its clients. 4 In his
appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Salman argued that his guilty verdict and three-year
prison sentence were not supported by legally sufficient evidence because the
investment banker had neither sought nor received a tangible benefit in
exchange for gratuitously tipping his brother. 5 The Ninth Circuit rejected that
argument and held, correctly in our opinion, that proof of a tangible benefit is
not required for joint tipper-tippee liability under Dirks, provided there is
sufficient evidence of an intention on the part of the tipper to give entrusted
information as a gift to a trading relative or friend. 6 The Ninth Circuit thus
created what is, at least arguably, a split with the Second Circuit’s controversial
ruling in United States v. Newman. 7
The five of us also agree that the Court’s classical and misappropriation
theories of insider trading fit awkwardly into a rubric of securities fraud under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 8 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. 9 These
complementary theories of insider trading are predicated on the Court’s
adaptation of fiduciary principles to Section 10(b)’s prohibition of deceptive
devices and contrivances “in connection with the purchase and sale of a
security.” 10 The classical approach from Dirks and Chiarella v. United States 11 is
directed at a corporate insider’s deceptive silence in transactions with
shareholders of the securities issuer. And the misappropriation approach from
United States v. O’Hagan 12 is premised on an outsider’s deception of the source of
the entrusted information. Both theories encompass a host of doctrinal
“anomalies,” 13 including (and perhaps particularly) Dirks’s notion that a tipper’s
breach of fiduciary duty can somehow impute to the tip’s recipient a disclosure
4. Id. at 1089.
5. Id. at 1093.
6. Id. at 1093-94.
7. The Court granted a Writ of Certiorari on the first question presented in the Petition:
Does the personal benefit to the insider that is necessary to establish insider trading under
Dirks v. SEC require proof of “an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at
least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature,” as the Second Circuit held
in United States v. Newman, or is it enough that the insider and the tippee shared a close family
relationship, as the Ninth Circuit held in this case?

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Salman, No. 15-628 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2015), 2015 WL
7180648, at *i (citations omitted).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2015)).
9. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2015).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
11. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
12. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
13. See Donald C. Langevoort, Setting the Agenda for Legislative Reform: Some Fallacies,
Anomalies, and Other Curiosities in the Prevailing Law of Insider Trading, 39 ALA. L. REV.
399, 403 (1988) (describing the “fiction of insider trading as fraud”).
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obligation of “trust and confidence,” provided the tippee “knows or should know
that there has been a breach.” 14 But in the absence of explicit statutory
prohibitions against insider trading and tipping, and because silence absent a
duty to disclose is not fraudulent, 15 we recognize the value of the Court’s legal
fictions.
The tipper-tippee liability issue in Dirks presented a particularly nettlesome
problem because tippees—such as the family members in Salman or the two
hedge fund managers whose convictions were vacated in Newman 16—are
typically strangers to both the securities issuer’s shareholders and the source of
the entrusted information. They are thus fiduciaries to neither shareholders nor
sources in any real sense. Dirks created the “personal benefit” test to determine
whether an insider’s disclosure of entrusted information breaches a fiduciary
duty, which then renders a tippee with awareness of that breach a “participant”
in the fiduciary’s fraud. 17 The test, according to the Court, must focus on
“objective criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit
from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will
translate into future earnings.” 18 But Dirks likewise observed that “[t]he elements
of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an
insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.” 19 Thus,
under Dirks’s personal benefit test, tippees assume a disclosure duty of trust and
confidence to transacting shareholders (under the classical theory) or to the
source of entrusted information (under the misappropriation theory) only when
material nonpublic information “has been made available to them improperly.” 20
At issue in Dirks were nonpublic disclosures made to a securities analyst by
corporate insiders, who did not act improperly because they “were motivated by
a desire to expose” a massive ongoing fraud at the corporation. 21
The Court in Dirks eschewed the SEC’s broader reading of Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, fearing that it would have “an inhibiting influence on the role of
market analysts.” 22As Pritchard observes from his review of initial drafts of the
Dirks opinion, Justice Lewis Powell “wanted to leave space for securities
professionals to uncover non-public information, even if it came from corporate
14. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983).
15. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (emphasizing the common law principle that “one who fails to

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

disclose material information prior to the consummation of a transaction commits fraud
only when he is under a duty to do so”).
See infra text accompanying notes 47-48.
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659.
Id. at 663 (emphasis other than i.e. added).
Id. at 664 (emphasis added).
Id. at 660.
Id. at 667.
Id. at 656-58.
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insiders.” 23 Justice Powell had been confident that trading on the basis of
selectively disclosed information would contribute to stock market pricing
efficiency, which the Court concluded “redounds to the benefit of all
investors.” 24
This Symposium’s consensus diverges when it comes to our opinions about
how the Salman Court should evaluate its insider trading law precedents. Fisch,
Macey, and Pritchard would like to see the Court strictly adhere to Dirks’s
personal benefit test. I agree that the Court should reaffirm Dirks insofar as it
held that only improper disclosures trigger joint tipper-tippee liability. 25 But in
my view, the Salman Court should instead employ the interpretive methodology
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg used in O’Hagan, construing Rule 10b-5 broadly to
effectuate the congressional objectives of “insur[ing] honest securities markets
and thereby promot[ing] investor confidence.” 26 The Salman Court should
likewise evaluate the investment banker’s gratuitous tips to his brother with a
view to O’Hagan’s misappropriation doctrine. That is, regardless whether a
fiduciary stands as an insider or outsider to the securities issuer, loyalty duties
are breached—and frauds are perpetrated—whenever fiduciaries secretly make
third-party disclosures that deprive principals of the “exclusive use” of entrusted
information. 27 Thus, O’Hagan supports a joint tipper-tippee liability test that
turns on evidence of disclosures that violate a fiduciary’s duty of loyalty,
whether or not the tipper acted self-servingly and sought or received a personal
benefit in exchange for the information. 28 Langevoort likewise questions why
personal benefit should continue to play such an outsized role in Rule 10b-5
liability determinations. 29
This Symposium also provides conflicting assessments of actions (and
inactions) by Congress, the Court, and the SEC in the development of insider
trading law. Pritchard, for instance, criticizes both the SEC, for pursuing a
largely litigation-oriented “campaign against insider trading,” and Congress, for
failing to “take responsibility for enacting criminal prohibitions” on insider
23. A.C. Pritchard, Dirks and the Genesis of Personal Benefit, 68 SMU L. REV. 857, 861 (2015).
24. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658 n.17 (observing that “market efficiency in pricing is significantly
25.
26.

27.
28.
29.

enhanced by [analyst] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information”).
See Donna M. Nagy, Beyond Dirks: Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading, 42 J. CORP. L. 1
(forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2665820.
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (“[I]nvestors likely would hesitate to
venture their capital in a market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic
information is unchecked by law.”).
Id. at 652.
Nagy, supra note 25, at 61-66.
See Donald C. Langevoort, Informational Cronyism, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 37, 39 (2016)
(contending that “there should be liability when an insider plays a corrupted Santa Claus
with corporate secrets”).
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trading. 30 Yet, as I see it, Congress’s multiple determinations to forego a
legislative definition evidence not abdication, but rather concerted judgments
that fraud-based insider trading and tipping proscriptions—and the interstitial
lawmaking inherent in such proscriptions—put securities traders on
appropriate notice that transactions based on misappropriated information will
be subject to stiff civil sanctions and harsh criminal penalties. 31 Fisch similarly
holds a favorable view of what she has elsewhere termed an insider trading
“lawmaking partnership” among Congress, the Court, and the SEC. 32
Our differing opinions about the judiciary’s and the SEC's respective
responsibilities for policy choices under the federal securities laws prompt
particularly stark disagreements over the interplay between Rule 10b-5’s scope
and Regulation FD, 33 which effectively bans what the SEC regards as “unfair
selective disclosure.” 34 The SEC promulgated Regulation FD in 2000 as an “issuer
disclosure rule” pursuant to its rulemaking power under Section 13(a) of the
Exchange Act. 35 The regulation, which seeks to create a more “level playing
field” for all investors, 36 prohibits issuer officials from selectively sharing
unreleased earnings announcements and other material nonpublic information
with securities analysts and other industry professionals. 37
Although it is clear that the SEC adopted Regulation FD to put an end to the
privileged status analysts and their clients enjoyed in the wake of Dirks, 38 the
30. A.C. Pritchard, The SEC and Insider Trading: A Sorry Tale of Administration Usurpation, 69

STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 57, 63 (2016).

31. See Nagy, supra note 25, at 34-44 (discussing the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984,

32.

33.
34.

35.
36.
37.
38.

the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, and the Stop Trading
on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012); id. at 32 & n.182 (differentiating the propertybased Rule 10b-5 fraud theory endorsed in O’Hagan from the due process concerns that
prompted the honest-services fraud holding in Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358
(2010)).
See Jill E. Fisch, Federal Securities Fraud Litigation as a Lawmaking Partnership, 93 WASH.
U. L. REV. 453, 469-70 (2015) (contending that insider trading “demonstrates the
advantages of the lawmaking partnership as a tool to develop financial regulation,” id. at
483).
17 C.F.R. § 243.100-243.103 (2015).
See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, [2000
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,319 at 83,680 (Aug. 15, 2000) [hereinafter
Selective Disclosure Release].
Id. at 83,666.
Id. at 83,677.
17 C.F.R. § 243.101.
See Donald C. Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA. L.
REV. 1023, 1024 (1990) (observing that insiders’ disclosures to analysts typically were not
unlawful after Dirks because they served a variety of corporate ends “such as to enhance
the company’s standing with the investor community or to strengthen pre-existing lines
of communication”).
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authors of this Symposium hold decidedly different views as to which policy
preferences—the SEC’s or the Dirks majority’s—should be accorded greater
weight in deciding when tipping selectively disclosed information and trading
on the basis of those tips constitute securities fraud. 39 Dirks’s policy rationale is
predicated on an empirical claim that some selective disclosures by insiders to
analysts are overall a positive force in securities markets. 40 It is hardly surprising
that our views differ not only on how to weigh the SEC’s contrary claim
(reflected in its adoption of Regulation FD after notice and comment), 41 but also
on how to regard post-Regulation FD evidence that supports the SEC’s
contentions. 42 We likewise disagree as to whether insiders who cause issuers to
violate Regulation FD and/or flagrantly contravene issuers’ compliance
procedures pertaining to market-sensitive information can ever be regarded
under Rule 10b-5 as acting “benignly” for legitimate corporate purposes. 43 As I
have argued, insiders who deliberately leak information in violation of
Regulation FD have failed to act in good faith and thereby breach their duty of

39. Compare Jonathan R. Macey, The Genius of the Personal Benefit Test, 69 STAN. L. REV.

40.

41.

42.

43.

ONLINE 64, 69 (2016) (arguing that in Rule 10b-5 insider trading cases, courts should
continue to defer to Dirks’s view of salutary selective disclosure but acknowledging that
Dirks “explicitly condoned” the selective disclosure practices that “the SEC made illegal”
seventeen years later in Regulation FD), with Langevoort, supra note 29, at 43 (explaining
that Regulation FD “took direct aim at the kind of selective disclosure to analysts that
Justice Powell (naively, I think) had treated as an unqualified good”). See also Nagy, supra
note 25, at 53 n.307 (raising, but leaving unresolved, the application of administrative
law principles in decisions including Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984)).
See supra text accompanying notes 22, 24 (quoting Dirks); see also Macey, supra note 39, at
70 (contending that Dirks recognized that “selective disclosure can benefit investors and
capital markets by ferreting out fraud . . . or by encouraging investor monitoring and
moving capital market prices to reflect more accurately underlying corporate values”).
See Selective Disclosure Release, supra note 34, at 83,677 (stating that “the practice of
selective disclosure leads to a loss of investor confidence in the integrity of our capital
markets”); Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 42,259
[1999–2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,228, at 82,849 & n. 19 (Dec. 20,
1999) (discussing ways in which selective disclosure impairs market efficiency).
Cf. Jill Fisch, Regulation FD: An Alternative Approach to Addressing Information Asymmetry,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING 112, 125 (Stephen M. Bainbridge ed., 2013)
(concluding that the “mixed results” from extensive empirical studies make it difficult
“to draw definitive conclusions about the effects of the Regulation”).
Compare Macey, supra note 39, at 70 (contending that insiders often tip for “benign”
reasons that do not benefit the insiders but rather further the interests of the company
whose confidential information is disclosed), with Nagy, supra note 25, at 55-58
(emphasizing state court decisions that construe breaches of the duty of loyalty to
encompass not only self-dealing but also other conduct evidencing a failure of act in
good faith, such as “where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable positive
law” (quoting Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (citation omitted)).
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loyalty “by causing the corporation to violate the positive laws that it is
obligated to obey.” 44
To be sure, because the investment banker/tipper at Citigroup was not an
official acting on behalf of a securities issuer, Regulation FD relates only
indirectly to the Salman petitioner’s claim that gratuitous tipping does not
support a conviction for securities fraud under Dirks. But because the Second
Circuit in Newman sought to facilitate efforts by securities analysts and other
market professionals to gather and use informational advantages in their
securities trading, 45 our respective views concerning selective disclosure inform
our opinions about what (if anything) the Court should say regarding the Second
Circuit’s determination in Newman to heighten the standard for proving a
personal benefit under Dirks.
The two initial tippers in Newman were insiders at Dell and NVIDIA, who
each, on multiple occasions, shared unreleased quarterly earnings information
with a casual friend. 46 For well over a year, the confidential information
traveled down two multilevel chains of securities analysts that ended with the
two hedge fund manager defendants. 47 Newman held that even if evidence
establishes that an insider and tippee are friends, the disclosures do not implicate
joint liability under Rule 10b-5 “in the absence of proof of a meaningfully close
personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective,
consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly
valuable nature.” 48
To varying degrees, Fisch, Pritchard, and Macey would each be satisfied
with a ruling by the Salman Court that does not disturb Newman’s formulation
of the personal benefit test and simply reiterates Dirks’s very clear “gift”
language—which fits to a T the informational tips from the investment banker
to his family members. But they highlight different reasons for championing
Newman. Pritchard argues that Rule 10b-5’s proscription against insider trading
and tipping, as unwritten prohibitions, should be interpreted narrowly because
they carry criminal consequences and were developed principally through
adjudication rather than rulemaking or (ideally) legislation. 49 Macey lauds the
44. Nagy, supra note 25, at 57-58 (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch.

45.

46.
47.
48.
49.

2003)). See Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 934-35 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“The knowing use
of illegal means to pursue profit for the corporation is director misconduct.”).
See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 449 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242
(2015) (“Efficient capital markets . . . require that persons who acquire and act on
information about companies be able to profit from the information they generate.”
(quoting United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 578 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J.,
concurring))).
Id. at 442-43.
Id.
Id. at 452.
See generally Pritchard, supra note 30.
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Newman opinion for recognizing what he regards as selective disclosure’s
“curative” effects. 50 In contrast, Fisch emphasizes the chilling effect that “an
ambiguous liability standard” has on efforts by analysts and traders to gather and
use legitimate research. 51 She therefore argues that the SEC’s concerns about
unfair selective disclosure are much better addressed through enforcement
actions against the issuers and their officials who “give professional traders
advantages over other investors” in violation of Regulation FD. 52
Langevoort and I, however, would be pleased if the Salman Court issues an
opinion that disavows Newman’s heightened standard for proving a personal
benefit. Newman’s focus on tangible benefits has impeded the government’s
ability to prosecute cases involving corrupt and arrogant disclosures of
entrusted information to casual friends and business cronies. 53 And, by invoking
Newman, a host of defendants have successfully sought court orders to vacate
their criminal convictions, guilty pleas, or civil liability judgments. 54
But our preference would be for the Salman Court to reconceptualize insider
trading law more generally, by establishing a synthesized doctrine of insider
trading and tipping that better aligns with the jurisprudence that has evolved in
the nearly twenty years since O’Hagan. 55 The approach I have advanced on other
occasions, 56 and that Langevoort considers “the best way to make sense of
insider trading law,” 57 was espoused by Chief Justice Warren Burger in his
Chiarella dissent, which deemed trading on wrongfully obtained information a
fraud on contemporaneous traders. 58
50. See Macey, supra note 39, at 68.
51. See Jill E. Fisch, Family Ties: Salman and the Scope of Insider Trading, 69 STAN. L. REV.
52.
53.

54.
55.

56.

57.
58.

ONLINE 46, 48 (2016).
Id. at 54.
See Langevoort, supra note 29, at 39 (contending that Newman’s “objective, consequential”
exchange language “is pernicious in a wide variety of professional settings that involve
fiduciary disloyalty without any visible return promise”).
See Patricia Hurtado, Inside Traders Who May Find Hope in Supreme Court Move: List 47 SEC.
REG & L. REP. 1930, 1930 (Oct. 5, 2015).
See Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA
L. REV. 1315, 1340-64 (2009) (charting the diminishing importance of fiduciary principles
in insider trading decisions by lower courts and settled enforcement proceedings).
See id. at 1373-78; Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider
Trading Liability: A Post-O’Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1296-1304 (1998); see
also Nagy, supra note 25, at 70 (contending that a new approach is warranted now
because insider trading jurisprudence has become “unnecessarily complex”).
See Langevoort, supra note 29, at 44.
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240-45 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (agreeing
with the majority’s observation that silence about material facts in business transactions
is generally permissible absent a fiduciary relationship between the parties, but arguing
that this general rule “should give way when an informational advantage is obtained, not
by superior experience, foresight, or industry, but by some unlawful means”).
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Interpreting Rule 10b-5 as the Chief Justice suggested would consolidate the
Court’s prior classical and misappropriation approaches into a unified
framework under which the investors who are “harm[ed]” 59 and “victim[ized]” 60
by the wrongful use of material nonpublic information are also the parties
deceived and defrauded. This new theory would thus parallel Section 20A of the
Exchange Act, which grants an express private right of action to those investors
trading contemporaneously with an insider-trader. 61 A “fraud on
contemporaneous traders” theory would also prohibit a broader range of
securities transactions based on material nonpublic information because the
disclosure obligation would turn not on a relationship of trust and confidence
but rather on the illicit nature of the informational advantage. The theory,
therefore, would support liability when information thieves (such as computer
hackers) trade securities based on market-moving information stolen from its
rightful owner, 62 and, as I have contended, in instances where the recipients of
repeated selective disclosures trade securities while aware of an insider’s
deliberate and disloyal violations of Regulation FD. 63 Finally, because securities
trading based on wrongfully obtained information has an “inhibiting impact on
market participation” 64 irrespective of a fiduciary connection, the new theory
would better advance what O’Hagan identified as the important policy objectives
of promoting the integrity of and investor confidence in the securities
markets, 65 which in turn enhances market efficiency. 66
If the Court were to endorse this unified and expanded framework, the
opinion in Salman would mark a monumental development in the law of insider
trading. But no matter how the Court resolves the issue of gratuitous tipping,
the spirited debate reflected in this Symposium is bound to continue for a long
time to come.

59. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 656 (1997) (observing that a misappropriator

60.

61.
62.
63.

64.
65.
66.

“deceives the source of the information and simultaneously harms members of the
investing public”).
Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058, 1067 (2014) (observing that an insider
trader’s “victims [are] ‘members of the investing public’ harmed by the defendant’s
gaining of an ‘advantageous market position’ through insider trading” (quoting O’Hagan,
521 U.S. at 644, 655)).
15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (2015).
See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009) (questioning whether the defendant’s
computer hacking constituted active deception or “mere[ly] theft”).
See Nagy, supra note 25, at 58-60, 65 n.366 (discussing the interplay between state
fiduciary law and Rule 10b-5, and suggesting revisions to Regulation FD clarifying its
overlap with Rule 10b-5’s prohibitions of insider trading and tipping).
See O’Hagan, 451 U.S. at 659.
See supra text accompanying note 26 (quoting O’Hagan, 451 U.S. at 658).
See supra note 41 (citing SEC Release proposing Regulation FD).
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